What might the future hold for the parts of Donbas that have suffered most from Russian aggression for the past 7 years?
AUTHOR
James Bolton-Jones, MA student at UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies.
Escalating violence on the frontline and a Russian military build-up on Ukraine’s border thrust the Donbas region back into international headlines. But as the world’s attention recedes, the challenges facing the embattled region do not.
Three thoughtful and thoroughly informed speakers, adroitly moderated by the FT’s Yuri Bender, gave deep insight into the long-term implications of these challenges at a Ukrainian Institute London event on 11 May 2021.
Considering three main topics – the Donbas’ identity, peacebuilding, and transitional justice – the panellists drew from their extensive knowledge and first-hand experience of the conflict to think about how the occupied territories could be re-integrated into Ukraine in the future?
Shifting Identities
Bender started the discussion by providing some context, gained from his own experience researching the region. Noting that the Donbas is vastly different from the monolithic, Russian-speaking rustbelt often portrayed in the media, he emphasised how its inhabitants have a plethora of shifting identities. They are, he said, much more open to dialogue than it might at first seem.
Stanislav Aseyev, a Donetsk-born writer and journalist held captive by separatists and subjected to torture for over two and a half years, reflected on the early days of the conflict. Back in March 2014, he recalled seeing various flags at a rally, including that of the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR). But at the time he and his friends thought of its supporters as a marginal group. This had all changed by July when, with the occupation by DNR supporters of administrative buildings and factories, it became clear that things were on the brink of major crisis.
‘On 1 March 2014, no one understood what this was about, what this Donetsk People’s Republic was, and who these people were. At that time we really thought they were some marginal characters, and it wasn’t just the opinion I held or my friend held, even though we lived in those places at the time and thought we basically understood the situation.’
In 2014 you could hear people warning someone who’d run afoul of the public norms somewhere in a store or in the street with the phrase, “I’ll call DNR!” It was not even imaginable that this would be a quasi-state
Stanislav Aseyev
A key factor in separatist support, said Aseyev, was Russian propaganda. With no pro-Ukrainian TV available, false stories of murderous fascists coming to attack had a huge impact on people. He ceased to recognise people he had known. Aseyev noted that often, older people who were most exposed to anti-Ukrainain propaganda broadcast on pro-Russian channels seemed to hate Ukraine more than their sons who were fighting on the frontline.
People living on either side of the contact line have more fluid identities than is often assumed. Natalia Mirimanova, a highly experienced conflict resolution practitioner and scholar, said people she encountered who straddled the contact line resented being considered less Ukrainian than anyone else.
The people of Donbas resent being labeled as “less Ukrainian”. Most feel Ukrainian. When I ask them “would you like to go back to Ukraine?” they say: “What do you mean? I live in Ukraine!”
Natalia Mirimanova
Peace Building
Early attempts to mediate were unsuccessful, said Mirimanova. Even in 2015, there was a lack of understanding that something significant was happening. These early failures created the impression in the occupied territories that people there had been abandoned by Ukraine and the full-scale war that broke out in spring 2014 united people in the separatist-held territories through this shared experience. This unity is now fraying, Mirimanova said.
When Bender asked about the role of oligarchs in peacebuilding, Mirimanova said their influence was mixed. As long as oligarchic structures persist in Ukraine, they will try to take advantage of political crises like those generated by the conflict.
Both Mirimanova and Aseyev emphasised that autonomy is not the answer for Donbas, because it was never at the heart of this conflict. It is not an identity-based conflict as was the case in Chechnya, for example.
The supposed desire for an autonomous ‘people of Donbas’ was manufactured. In fact, Donbas is very diverse
Stanislav Aseyev
Transitional Justice
One of the most complex aspects of bringing the occupied areas back to Ukraine in the future will be the question of transitional justice. For Kateryna Busol, a Ukrainian lawyer specialising in international human rights and transitional justice, there should be four components to this:
- Prosecutions at a national and international level;
- A truth commission;
- Reparations for survivors of human rights abuses; and
- Institutional reform.
At the moment, the prosecutorial approach is dominating, she said. There needs to be greater emphasis on the plight of the victims, and the question of reparations.
Aseyev commented on just how hard the process of reconciliation and transitional justice will be. Many who left their homes in conflict-afflicted areas have no plans to return. Their houses have either been destroyed or occupied, and they cannot conceive living in the same apartment block as former separatist combatants. Aseyev said he may be able to stop and talk to someone he knew well before the outbreak of conflict for a couple of minutes, but no more. He cannot imagine finding common ground with separatist supporters, mostly because they simply would not believe his story, neutralising his experience.
It will be hard for me to return to Donbas not only because I was kidnapped, tortured, but because there are many who will not believe my story and dismiss my experience
Stanislav Aseyev
Though the future may seem bleak, Bender noted that the examples of Northern Ireland and Cyprus show that some degree of reconciliation is possible.
Watch the full event recording on our YouTube channel.
